Appellate Practice Section of The Florida Bar

Parental Rights and the “Careful Description” in Light of Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa County

By: Katie Jay[1]

Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit held on July 6 that a father convicted of possessing child pornography keeps the fundamental right to live with his son, and that Alabama’s lifetime bar on such parents residing or staying overnight with their minor children must satisfy strict scrutiny. Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa Cnty., 180 F.4th 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2026) (en banc). The court divided 8–5 over how to describe the right, the “careful description” that decides most substantive-due-process cases before any scrutiny begins.

Bruce Henry pleaded guilty in 2013, served five years, completed treatment, married, and in 2021 had a son. Id. at 1298–99. Alabama’s registration act lets registrants live with their own children but withdraws that exemption from anyone convicted of a sex offense involving a child, possession included. Ala. Code §§ 15-20A-11(d)(4), 15-20A-4(27). The bar is lifelong, with no procedure for relief. Henry, 180 F.4th at 1300. Henry sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court held the provision facially unconstitutional and enjoined it universally; a panel affirmed as applied, found strict scrutiny unmet, and vacated the universal injunction. Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa Cnty., 135 F.4th 1271 (11th Cir. 2025). The court then took the case en banc sua sponte, vacated the panel opinion, 150 F.4th 1370 (11th Cir. 2025), and limited rehearing to one question: whether applying the provision to bar Henry from living or staying overnight with his son violates substantive due process. Henry, 180 F.4th at 1300–01.

Judge Rosenbaum, writing for eight judges, described the right as a parent’s right to live with his child. The Supreme Court has recognized that right since Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), through Moore and Troxel, and again in March in Mirabelli v. Bonta, 607 U.S. 492, 497 (2026) (per curiam). Henry, 180 F.4th at 1302–05. No precedent carves a class of parents out of the right: Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 658 (1972), framed the interest as a parent’s, not an unwed parent’s, and Michael H., Quilloin, and Lehr narrowed the description only where two putative fathers’ claims collided. Henry, 180 F.4th at 1305–09. The nineteenth-century sources Alabama relied on say custody “may be forfeited by misconduct,” and the majority read “may” as discretion: courts weighed past conduct in an individualized inquiry into the child’s welfare at the time, and none treated a conviction as a permanent loss. Id. at 1310–17. The nature of the right forbids the exception: if a legislature could define “misconduct” and strip every parent so labeled, the fundamental right would exist only if permitted by the legislature. Alabama’s argument “would take the reason for burdening a fundamental right and mistake it for a reason why the right isn’t fundamental in the first place.” Id. at 1319.

That holding placed the case on the strict-scrutiny track. Alabama’s interest in child safety is compelling; whether a permanent bar with no exit is narrowly tailored returns to the panel. Id.

Judge Rosenbaum concurred separately on the level of generality. Each right’s own history fixes the breadth of its description—marriage described broadly in Loving and Obergefell, assisted suicide narrowly in Glucksberg—so rules drawn from cases about other rights do not transfer. Id. at 1319–24 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). She added that, under Mirabelli, the circuit’s narrow description of the parental right in Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Alabama, 80 F.4th 1205, 1224 (11th Cir. 2023), “was likely wrong.” Henry, 180 F.4th at 1324 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).

Chief Judge Pryor, joined by Judges Newsom, Branch, and Lagoa, and by Judge Luck in part, would have described the asserted right as “the right of a child-sex convict to reside with his minor child.” Id. at 1324 (W. Pryor, C.J., dissenting). Reno v. Flores, Glucksberg, and Department of State v. Muñoz require a description tailored to what the challenged law forbids; the circuit’s own sex-offender cases, Doe v. Moore among them, describe a registrant’s rights by reference to his conviction; and a right so described has no deep roots in a tradition that punished sex offenses against children with death. Id. at 1325–33 (W. Pryor, C.J., dissenting). The four full dissenters went further: the parties had briefed strict scrutiny, the provision satisfies it, and the majority “shirks its judicial duty” by remanding to a panel that, the dissent predicts, will reinstate its analysis “lock, stock, and barrel.” Id. at 1325, 1335 (W. Pryor, C.J., dissenting).

For Florida practitioners the decision fixes the threshold: a statute that strips a defined class of parents of the right to live with their children burdens a fundamental right, and the state’s reasons for singling out that class are weighed at the tailoring stage rather than used to define the right away. Florida has both models on its books. Section 39.0139, Florida Statutes, treats a conviction under chapter 827 (possession under section 827.071 included) as a rebuttable presumption of detriment that bars visitation or other contact in a dependency case, rebutted at an evidentiary hearing on clear and convincing proof that the child is not endangered—the individualized inquiry the majority found in the historical record. Chapter 63 keeps the categorical one. The flush-left paragraph of section 63.092(3) bars placing a minor in any home where a person convicted of an offense listed in section 63.089(4)(b)2 resides—a list that reaches habitual violent felony offenders under section 775.084—with no allowance for rehabilitation, no time limit, and no exception for a placement the birth parents chose.Two questions arise in the adoption context: whether the parental right the court refused to narrow includes a birth parent’s choice of the family that will raise her child, and whether it extends to prospective adoptive parents. On remand, the panel held on September 29th that Alabama’s bar fails strict scrutiny as applied to Henry, a non-contact offender. Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa Cnty., No. 24-10139, slip op. at 30 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2026). Alabama may still seek rehearing en banc or certiorari.


[1]Katie Jay is a founding partner of Jay & Campbell, PLLC, in Stuart, and is board certified in State and Federal Government and Administrative Practice. Her practice centers on appeals and administrative litigation in child-welfare and family-formation cases.

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